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Abstract

Despite numerous reform efforts over the past 30 years, acquisition programs in
the Department of Defense (DoD) continue to experience cost overruns and schedule
delays. One contributing factor is the decision-making process used by defense officials.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) has stated that ‘poor program outcomes are the
lack of widespread adoption of a knowledge-based acquisition process within DoD
despite polices that support such a process. A knowledge-based business case at the
outset of each program would alleviate overpromising on cost, schedule, and
performance and would empower program managers.’
Effective decision-making for acquisition programs is very important. It not only
affects the performance of a program but could also impact the lives of Airman, Soldiers,
Sailors, and Marines protecting our country. Analyzing decision support products is one
method to improve the knowledge used during the decision-making process. Therefore,
the scope of this research focused on knowledge products supporting decisions made by
DoD acquisition officials and their alignment with best practices and their usefulness to
decision-makers.
This research found that the required information contained in decision support
products is not adequate to provide the knowledge needed to make informed decisions.
Recommendations for improving decision support for key knowledge areas will be
discussed.
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KNOWLEDGE-BASED DECISION SUPPORT IN DOD ACQUISITIONS

Chapter I. Introduction

Changes in the acquisition process in the Department of Defense (DoD) have
been on-going over the course of the past three decades. The problem, however, is that
most reforms that have been implemented have largely been unsuccessful (Friedman,
2009). The reasons for the failure of acquisition reform are complicated and are due to
many different factors. Despite these reform efforts, many programs are still being
completed behind schedule and with substantial cost overruns. Even worse, the
acquisition process within the DoD has actually become less consistent (Dawn et al.,
1998). The end-result is an acquisition system that is facing greater problems and
resulting in even more wasted resources for the United States military (Gill, 2001).
One problem that exists for the DoD is that the acquisition process is largely
based on external influences as opposed to a genuine knowledge-based approach to
acquiring new systems and materials (Ignols and Brem, 1998). What is needed for the
DoD acquisition community is to ensure that the right knowledge is captured at key
decision points to determine the most effective means by which to acquire new weapon
systems. Therefore, this research is designed to investigate what is occurring within the
DoD acquisition decision-making process. It is these decisions (most of which are made
early in a program’s life-cycle) that are causing less than ideal results with regard to
weapon system programs being behind schedule, over budget, and at times not
performing as planned.
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Background
In its most basic form, knowledge-based decision-making is simply the process of
collecting and using data and information to gain knowledge that can be used to make
informed decisions (Fay, 2007). This process can be a powerful tool in which
organizations utilize the synthesis of data and information that will lead to making better
decisions. Although used by both public and private sector organizations, there are
differences in the ways in which they utilize this process. The differences are normally
attributed to the role that these organizations play in society. However, although
recognized, the influence of the context in which knowledge-based decision support is
made is largely unexplored (Papadakis and Barwise, 1998).
In the private sector, through market research, companies use knowledge-based
decision support primarily to make predictions about customer behaviors and
expectations. They then attempt to meet those behaviors and expectations with products
and services. Companies in the private sector collect large amounts of data about their
customers and even the customers of competing companies to understand their needs and
desires (Doukidis, Mylonopoulos & Pouloudi, 2004). In other words, most companies in
the private sector do not make decisions until they have collected large amounts of data
about the people they serve. Then, the decisions made by everyone from company
executives to front-line personnel are based on the knowledge that is gained from
analyzing the collected data (Vercellis, 2009).
For the private sector, an entire industry exists of companies that do nothing more
than collect and analyze data about customer actions, behaviors, and attitudes.
Corporations in the private sector typically only make decisions once they have taken the
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time to analyze the data and understand how they can best respond to their customers, as
well as meet the needs of potential customers to win their loyalty and business (Jones,
1998). The private sector has embraced the concept of knowledge-based decisionmaking because it provides a means of having a strong foundation from which to operate
and from which to determine what changes are needed for the future.
The public sector, however, seems to use the concept of knowledge-based
decision-making in a slightly different way as compared to the public sector. Public
sector organizations, from the federal government to the state and local levels, use
knowledge-based decision-making as a way to determine outcomes from the way in
which money and other resources are used in relation to policy initiatives (Metcalfe,
2006). In some respects, the use of knowledge-based decision-making seems to occur
more often after resources have been used as opposed to before. For example, data is
often collected with regards to how additional spending for education initiatives have
impacted test scores, or how many people are provided access to health care services
because of additional spending to open free health clinics.
Most public sector organizations, especially at the federal level, are often large
and complex. Since the process of knowledge-based decision-making is largely
dependent upon the size and complexity of an organization, it can be hard to implement
in the public sector (Miller & Berger, 2003). This provides some understanding of why
public sector organizations appear to use the concepts of knowledge-based decisionmaking in a different way as compared to the private sector. This is certainly true in
terms of the federal government in which actions and initiatives must be taken for
millions of people in different locations and with a variety of different needs. However,
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once a decision is made, then data can be collected about the outcomes resulting from the
resources that were used. This knowledge is used to determine if the return on
investment with regard to the resources that were expended is favorable, which leads to
better decision-making in the future.
Regardless of the sector in which it is used, the underlying principle for
knowledge-based decision-making is the transfer of knowledge to a group of people or an
organization to increase the knowledge that exists about a specific situation, clients, or
work processes (Srikantaiah & Koenig, 2008). Additionally, the result of this process is
that knowledge has been gained by the organization in question and decisions are based
on actual information and data instead of personal opinions or perceptions. The ultimate
benefit is the ability to make decisions based on known conditions that positively impact
an organization (Salas & Maurino, 2010). This positive impact will allow organizations
to better respond to the conditions that exist as opposed to simply trusting that the
decisions that are made will meet the needs of the organization.

Research Problem
There is a lack of the adoption of knowledge-based decision-making within the
DoD acquisition process. The acquisition process takes into consideration many forms of
information products regarding programs both by federal statute and DoD regulation.
However, the milestone decisions based on these information requirements have not
translated into better program outcomes. Additionally, milestone decisions are normally
made when all statutory and regulatory information requirements are satisfied and not
based on when critical technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge is attained. As
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a result, DoD acquisition programs continue to experience problems with both increased
cost and schedule and the degradation of performance and quality.

Research Objective
To address this problem, DoD acquisition officials require improved decision-making
information at key program junctures that capture all program goals, objectives, and
concerns to facilitate better knowledge-based decisions. Therefore, the objective of this
research is to assess the use of knowledge-based decision support in the DoD acquisition
process. To address this objective, the research attempted to answer the following
investigative questions.
1. What are the critical pieces of information that are required for an informed
decision at key decision points in the acquisition process?
2. How does the currently available information (contained in required decision
products) compare to what is needed for decisions with regard to technology,
design, and production knowledge for each of the key decision points in the
acquisition process?
3. What is the effect of this lack of information on DoD acquisition programs?
4. Can this effect be quantified in terms of cost, schedule, and performance?

Methodology
To help answer these investigative questions, a secondary data source was
examined and compared with the knowledge required by either federal statute or DoD
regulation at key decision points. Both entities were also compared with knowledgebased decision-making best practices identified through the literature review. The data
consisted of responses from senior-level Air Force acquisition officials interviewed by
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the Air Force Acquisition Chief Process Office regarding the acquisition decision-making
process. These interviews helped identify data products used during decision-making and
how those products influenced decisions at key milestones. After summarizing the
interview data using descriptive statistics, data reduction was accomplished using
Microsoft Excel software to perform content analysis and identify themes represented
within the interview data. This facilitated the comparison of the data with required
knowledge and best practices used with knowledge-based decision-making during the
acquisition process.

Thesis Outline
In the chapters that follow, the findings of the in-depth literature review, research
methodology and analysis, and results will be presented. The study will establish if the
intention and usefulness of required information at key decision points in acquisition
programs provides sufficient knowledge to facilitate more informed decisions. It will
examine if key decisions are made at the appropriate time within the defense acquisition
process. The literature review in Chapter II will provide the context of the DoD
acquisition process, the information required by federal statute and DoD regulation, and
best practices with regard to knowledge-based decision-making. Additionally, it will
provide a comparison of knowledge-based decision-making in the private and public
sector. In Chapter III, the methodology and research design will be discussed; this is
followed by an analysis of the data in Chapter IV. The final chapter will answer the
research questions and provide recommendations for improving knowledge-based
decision-making in DoD acquisition programs.
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Chapter II. Literature Review

To focus this research effort on the knowledge required to make decisions for
acquisition programs at key decision points in the Department of Defense (DoD)
acquisition process, the literature review is divided into three parts. The first is an
examination of the differences in the acquisition practices in the public and private sector.
The second offers a baseline for the statutory and regulatory knowledge requirements of
the DoD acquisition system at key milestones. Finally, the third section reviews studies
regarding best practices of knowledge-based decision support.

Acquisition Practices: Military versus Private Sector
There are some notable differences in terms of how acquisition efforts work
within the DoD and similar efforts in the private sector. Some of these variations are
primarily due to the differences in organizational goals. Ferguson and DeRiso (1994)
completed a detailed study of software acquisition efforts between the DoD and the
private sector in terms of defining program requirements, selecting a contractor (i.e.,
source selection), test and evaluation, and the development process. Although their
research dealt primarily with software acquisitions, the findings are applicable to the
acquisition process of traditional weapon systems.
Defining Program Requirements
In terms of defining the requirements for a system, the DoD generates
requirements based on the needs of an operational user. This requirements generation
process, called the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), is
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focused on identifying requirements for weapon systems for the entire DoD as opposed to
the individual services (CJCSI 3170.01G, 2009). However, in a 2008 study, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) found that the process has yet to be effective in this manner.
According to the report, nearly 70 percent of the requirements were sponsored by the
individual services as opposed to the joint community (GAO, 2008). Additionally, it
noted that nearly almost all of these requirements were approved. As a result, there has
not been any notable fiscal efficiency gained through the JCIDS process. In fact, the
remaining costs of major weapon systems have increased significantly since JCIDS was
implemented. Figure 1 depicts the cost remaining versus the annual investment
appropriations.

Figure 1. Cost Remaining versus Annual Investment Appropriations (GAO, 2008)

A critical factor within the requirements generation process is the time it takes to
validate a requirement. In the aforementioned report, the GAO (2008) found that the
average time to validate a DoD requirement was 10 months. In the private sector though,
it is not unusual for companies to validate requirements on a quarterly basis (Bate and
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Roberts, 2002). The responsiveness associated with validating a requirement can mean
the ability to respond to a threat or beating a competitor to market with a new product
(Dasarathy, 1985).
Accurately capturing key system requirements early in the acquisition process has
a direct impact on the outcome of a program. However, a preponderance of DoD
acquisition programs fail to do so. As a result, most of these programs changed key
system requirements after the start of development. These changes translated into
increased costs and schedule delays (GAO, 2010). In an attempt to reduce changes in
requirements, the DoD issued a change in policy requiring programs to hold
configuration steering boards to make certain that the effect of cost and performance are
considered when making major technical adjustments (GAO, 2010).
Source Selections
Another key difference between the DoD and private sector is the communication
with vendors prior to source selection. Within the DoD, the involvement of vendors and
contractors is often avoided until a specific vendor or contractor has been chosen, thus
reducing the sharing of information and knowledge that is used in the decision-making
process. In the private sector, vendors and contractors are encouraged to become
involved very early in the process to leverage their knowledge and information (Ferguson
and DeRiso, 1994).
In terms of vendor or contract selection, the DoD typically operates by requiring
vendors or contractors to compete against each other, rather than collaborate to combine
knowledge sets and abilities to win a contract as a unified team. The selection of a
vendor or contactor also relies on a very specific set of standards that cannot be changed
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or deviated from in any way. If any of the source selection metrics created in advance is
not met by a particular vendor or contractor, the vendor or contractor is often removed
from the selection process without any consideration regarding whether their knowledge
set might be useful for the project. Again, this is different from acquisition efforts in the
private sector in which vendors are typically allowed to work together in order to obtain
the highest level of knowledge and ability from those that can best serve the project.
Private sector vendor or contractor selection also has a selection process that is much less
stringent and allows for more flexibility based on the recommendations and information
obtained by the source selection team (Ferguson and DeRiso, 1994). Table 1 shows the
differences in vendor selection in the private sector and the DoD.

Table 1. Best Practice – Vendor Selection (Ferguson and DeRiso, 1994)

Test and Evaluation
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Test and evaluation is the next key knowledge area explored in this research.
Like the DoD, leading private sector firms have dedicated test organizations for new
products. However, in general, these organizations are aligned under the program
manager and testing is often performed in a single facility by the same team members
(Ferguson and DeRiso, 1994). The DoD conversely uses independent organizations to
test systems (DoD Test and Evaluation Guide, 2005). As such, there is opportunity for
gaps in knowledge transfer. Additionally, the GAO (2010) found that programs are not
testing prototypes that are production representative before committing to production. In
doing so, the maximum benefit of test and evaluation is not realized due to the possibility
of changes to the design after production. Figure 2 shows the GAO findings with regard
to the number of programs testing a production representative prototype before and after
a production decision.
Perhaps the biggest difference in test and evaluation is that the private sector
makes less of a distinction between developmental and operational testing (Ferguson and
DeRiso, 1994). The reason is two-fold: first, by the time the private sector makes a
decision to field a new product, the technology is proven. Second, the cycle time in
product development is typically much longer in the DoD. Therefore, more technical risk
is assumed early in the life-cycle while anticipating that the technology readiness level
will mature.
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Figure 2. Testing of Production-Ready Prototypes (GAO, 2008)

Development Process Requirements
Another notable difference between the acquisition process within the DoD and
the private sector can be attributed to the rigidity of the process for product development.
Strict requirements imposed by Congress and the DoD are inflexible and largely based on
a single project, rather than understanding existing systems and the impact of future
projects that may be implemented. In essence, a large part of the acquisition process is
focused on following the process itself and not on how knowledge can be applied to
making more informed decisions (Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment, 2006).
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Knowledge Requirements of the Defense Acquisition Process
The DoD acquisition process exists to provide a secure and supportable military
to maintain our national security strategies (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2009). The
process is governed by the Federal Acquisitions Regulation (FAR) and implemented by
DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02. The DoDI 5000.02 provides the framework in which a
program progresses throughout its life-cycle. Figure 3 illustrates the life-cycle
framework view of the acquisition process. In addition to the decisions at Milestones A,
B, and C (which authorize entrance into the major program phases), there are three other
key decision points within this framework that must be made by the Milestone Decision
Authority (MDA) (Young, Grimes, and McQueary, 2008). These decision points (also
noted in Figure 3) are Materiel Development Decision, Post-Critical Design Review, and
Full Rate Production Decision Review.

Figure 3. Decision Points in DoD Acquisition Process (DoDI 5000.02, 2009)
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The acquisition process itself is initiated by a validated need identified by the
military user. The need can stem from a new threat, capability gap, or even a new
technological opportunity. For this need to be addressed via the acquisition process, a
determination is made whether a Materiel or Non-Materiel Solution is viable. This
decision is made at the Materiel Development Decision (MDD) review, which is the
formal entry point into the acquisition process and is mandatory for all programs. At this
decision point, there is not any statutory knowledge requirement. However, the
knowledge required by regulation includes an Analysis of Alternatives and an Initial
Capabilities Document.
If a Materiel Solution is deemed the better alternative, the program is authorized
to enter the Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase. The purpose of the MSA phase is
to review potential materiel solutions and satisfy the entrance criteria for the next
program milestone designated by the MDA. The Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Study
Guidance and the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) provide direction for the activities
in this phase. The AoA focuses on identifying and analyzing alternatives, measures of
effectiveness, cost, schedule, concepts of operations, and overall risk (Young, Grimes,
and McQueary, 2008). The ICD provides the preliminary concept of operations, a
description of the capability, the operational risk, and the basis for determining that nonmateriel alternatives will not adequately alleviate the capability gap. The MSA phase
ends when the AoA has been completed, materiel solution options for the capability need
identified in the approved ICD have been recommended, and the phase-specific entrance
criteria for the initial review milestone have been satisfied (Young, Grimes, and
McQueary, 2008).

14

The next decision point is the Milestone A review. This decision authorizes entry
into the Technology Development phase. The purpose of this phase is to reduce
technology risk, determine and mature the proper set of technologies to be included in the
system, and demonstrate that the technology performs on prototypes. Table 2 depicts the
key statutory and regulatory information required of Major Defense Acquisition
Programs (MDAP) for this phase. The complete set of information requirements for
Milestone A can be found in Appendix A.

Table 2. Key Milestone A Statutory/Regulatory Information
STATUTORY INFORMATION
REQUIRED
Analysis of Alternatives
Consideration of Technology Issues
Independent Cost Estimate
Milestone Decision Authority Program
Certification
Technology Development Strategy (TDS)
REGULATORY INFORMATION
REQUIRED
Initial Capabilities Document
Life-Cycle Support Plan
Systems Engineering Plan
Test and Evaluation Strategy

APPLICABLE STATUTE, POLICY, AND
OTHER REFERENCES
Subtitle III of title 40, U.S.C., Section 2366a of Title
10
Paragraph (b)(5) of Section 2364 of Title 10, U.S.C.
Section 2434 of Title 10, U.S.C.
Section 2366a of Title 10, U.S.C.
Section 803 of Public Law 107-314
APPLICABLE REGULATION, POLICY, AND
OTHER REFERENCES
CJCS Instruction 3170.01
DoD Directive 5250.01
DoD Instruction 5000.02
DoD Instruction 5000.02

The next key decision point is the Milestone B review. This decision authorizes a
program to enter the Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD) phase. The
purpose of this phase is to develop a weapon system or an increment of capability. The
entrance criteria for this phase depend heavily upon technology maturity, mature/stable
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requirements, and full funding. Entrance into EMD also signals the beginning of a
formal acquisition program. Table 3 shows both the key statutory and regulatory
information required for this decision (Young, Grimes, and McQueary, 2008). The full
set of requirements can be found in Appendix B.

Table 3. Key Milestone B Statutory/Regulatory Information
STATUTORY INFORMATION
REQUIRED
Acquisition Program Baseline
Consideration of Technology Issues
Independent Cost Estimate
Low-Rate Initial Production Quantities
Live Fire Test and Evaluation Plan
REGULATORY INFORMATION
REQUIRED
Acquisition Strategy
Technology Readiness Assessment
Capabilities Development Document
Life-Cycle Support Plan
Systems Engineering Plan
Test and Evaluation Master Plan

APPLICABLE STATUTE, POLICY, AND OTHER
REFERENCES
Section 2435 of title 10, U.S.C.
Paragraph (b)(5) of Section 2364 of Title 10, U.S.C.
Section 2434 of Title 10, U.S.C.
Section 2400 of Title 10, U.S.C.
Section 2366 of Title 10, U.S.C.
APPLICABLE REGULATION, POLICY, AND
OTHER REFERENCES
DoD Instruction 5000.02
DoD Instruction 5000.02
CJCS Instruction 3170.01
DoD Directive 5250.01
DoD Instruction 5000.02
DoD Instruction 5000.02

The EMD phase contains two major elements: Integrated System Design (ISD)
and System Capability and Manufacturing Process Demonstration (SD&MPD). The ISD
identifies system and system-of-systems functionality and interfaces, completes design
for hardware and software, and reduces system-level risk. The SD&MPD reveals the
capability of the system to function as designed and be manufactured. In addition to
these two efforts, the EMD phase also includes a major decision point: the Post-Critical

16

Design Review (P-CDR) Assessment. This assessment offers an opportunity to review
design maturity (Young, Grimes, and McQueary, 2008).
The next and final key decision point addressed in this research is Milestone C.
This milestone authorizes entrance into the Production and Deployment phase. The
intent of this phase is to demonstrate that the production system can operate in
accordance with the user’s requirements. Additionally, this phase demonstrates that the
production system can be manufactured (Young, Grimes, and McQueary, 2008). Table 4
shows the key statutory and regulatory information requirements for Milestone C. The
full set of requirements can be found in Appendix C.

Table 4. Key Milestone C Statutory/Regulatory Information Requirements
STATUTORY INFORMATION
REQUIRED
Acquisition Program Baseline
Consideration of Technology Issues
Independent Cost Estimate
Manpower Estimate
Analysis of Alternatives
REGULATORY INFORMATION
REQUIRED
Acquisition Strategy
Technology Readiness Assessment
Capabilities Production Document
Life-Cycle Support Plan
Systems Engineering Plan
Test and Evaluation Master Plan
Independent Technology Readiness
Assessment (if required)

APPLICABLE STATUTE, POLICY, AND OTHER
REFERENCES
Section 2435 of title 10, U.S.C.
Paragraph (b)(5) of Section 2364 of Title 10, U.S.C.
Section 2434 of Title 10, U.S.C.
Section 2434 of Title 10, U.S.C.
Subtitle III of title 40, U.S.C., Section 2366a of title 10
APPLICABLE REGULATION, POLICY, AND
OTHER REFERENCES
DoD Instruction 5000.02
DoD Instruction 5000.02
CJCS Instruction 3170.01
DoD Directive 5250.01
DoD Instruction 5000.02
DoD Instruction 5000.02
DoD Instruction 5000.02
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Knowledge-Based Decision Support Best Practices
The GAO has completed extensive research with regard to knowledge-based
decision-making in major system acquisitions. In fact, the GAO (2008) published their
findings regarding best practices for developing new products and stated the following:

Good acquisition outcomes require the use of a knowledge-based approach to
product development that demonstrates high levels of knowledge before
significant commitments are made. Achieving the right knowledge at the right
time enables leadership to make informed decisions about when and how best to
move into various acquisition phases. In essence, knowledge supplants risk over
time. This building of knowledge consists of information that should be gathered
at three critical points over the course of a program. (p.5)
In a 2010 study, the GAO assessed the knowledge attained on 42 major defense
acquisition programs (MDAP) at key milestones early in the program’s life-cycle (prior
to Milestone C). To support the study, the GAO collected data on programs with regard
to technology maturity, design stability, and production maturity from August 2009 to
March 2010. The study centers on the following three key junctures for knowledge
points.
- Knowledge Point 1: Requirements and technological capability are matched
- Knowledge Point 2: Knowledge that design will work as required
- Knowledge Point 3: Knowledge that the design can be produced within cost,
schedule, and quality targets
Figure 4 shows these knowledge points in relation to key phases in the product
development cycle.
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Figure 4. Best Practices in Product Development (GAO, 2008)

The first of these knowledge points suggests that a match should occur between
what is needed and what is available in terms of technology, design, and funding. This
knowledge point occurs after the completion of the technology development phase. A
good gauge of whether a match is made is noting the level of technology maturity at the
beginning of the development stage. A match occurs when a program has demonstrated
that the critical technologies have been verified to work in their intended environment
(GAO, 2008). The GAO (2010) found that programs in general are not conducting
systems engineering reviews early in the program to ensure a match between resources
and requirements.
The second knowledge point represents the fact that a product’s design should be
demonstrated to function as planned and meet the requirements that have been
established (GAO, 2008). For DoD milestone decision authorities, this means being
assured that the system design is stable and will perform in a way that was expected by
the user. According to the GAO, program stability should be reached by the halfway
point of system development. An indicator of design stability is the completion of at
least 90 percent of engineering drawings by the Critical Design Review (GAO, 2008).
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Additionally, the engineering drawings and designs should accurately reflect the results
obtained from testing the system in question.
This leads to the third knowledge point, which suggests that a product should only
be considered reliable when it can be created within the stated costs, schedule, and
quality levels. An important indication of whether a product or system is reliable is when
it can be created over and over with the same level of performance and reliability (Garrett
and Rendon, 2005). To facilitate reliability, a best practice is to make certain that all
critical manufacturing processes are in statistical control at the start of production (GAO,
2008). A program should ensure that all critical manufacturing knowledge is attained
before entering production. If achieved, then the program will have a stable
manufacturing process that will work as intended and meet cost, schedule, and quality
objectives. Figure 5 is an example of how the best practices can be used to assess an
acquisition program. The desired level (dotted line) is the indicator of where the program
should be in terms of best practice. The hypothesis is the closer the program is to the
desired level; the more likely the program will be within cost and schedule (GAO, 2010).
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Figure 5. Product Knowledge as Compared with Best Practices (GAO, 2008)

Application of GAO Knowledge Points: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
To apply the knowledge points, the GAO (2005) reviewed and analyzed the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) project management policies
and compared them to the GAO’s best practices on knowledge-based decision making.
The study was primarily focused on the Goddard Space Flight Center, the Jet Propulsion
Lab, Johnson Space Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center. During its investigation,
the GAO found NASA deficient in key criteria and decision reviews to fully implement a
knowledge-based acquisition framework.
There were, however, some best practices followed. For example, NASA
required projects to hold a major decision review before progressing from formulation to
implementation. Additionally, projects were required to validate requirements, develop
cost and schedule estimates, create preliminary design, and have an approved technology
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plan. All of these requirements were in sync with the GAO’s Knowledge Point 1:
Matching requirements with technology capability. The issue is that NASA does not
require the technology used in its projects to be at a high level of maturity at that point.
The GAO insists that this increases the risk that requirements will not be met.
Another area found to be deficient was the NASA policy of not specifying the
type of reviews that project managers should hold at key points in the product
development cycle. The GAO indicated that technical reviews allow decision-makers to
acquire key knowledge at critical junctures in the project’s development. As a result, the
GAO concluded that NASA was increasing the risk of cost and schedule overruns.
The last issue GAO found during its study of NASA was the non-standard use of
criteria for indicators of program success at key decision points. This resulted in each
center within NASA reporting on different types of project knowledge at key decision
points. At the time of the report, NASA had experienced a loss of experienced project
managers and system engineers. This loss of key personnel combined with lack of
standardized criteria exacerbated the problem (GAO, 2005).
The GAO (2005) made several recommendations to improve NASA management
policies. Two recommendations centered on NASA using a knowledge-based acquisition
approach to improve its decision-making. As such, it recommended that NASA take the
following actions:
1. Require the capture of specific knowledge to be used as criteria for allowing
projects to enter implementation and proceed through development and to support
informed investment decisions.
2. Institute additional reviews for projects during project implementation, which
result in recommendations to the appropriate decision authority.
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In response to the GAO findings, NASA issued a revised acquisition policy in
2007. The new policy instituted Key Decision Points (KDP) in the development lifecycle for NASA’s space flight programs and ground station projects. Additionally, the
policy established a decision authority at each KDP responsible for authorizing the
entrance into the next phase. The policy also required new technologies to be sufficiently
mature at the preliminary design review (GAO, 2009).
In a follow-up study, the GAO (2009) again reviewed NASA’s projects. In this
review, the GAO assessed cost and schedule data for 13 programs. They found that 10 of
the 13 programs experienced an average cost growth of 13 percent (based on 2008 data)
since the GAO review in 2005. The average schedule delay for the 13 programs was 11
months. GAO concluded that in spite of the new policy, the lack of knowledge at key
junctures and the continued use of immature technologies continued to contribute to cost
growth and schedule delay.
Application of Statistical Decision Model: University of Southern California
The study of the use of knowledge-based decision methodologies in DoD
acquisitions, such as the use of statistical tests and models, is an area that has been largely
unexplored. A study by Cohen, Rolph, and Steffey (1988) examined the statistical
techniques in the design and evaluation of operational test and evaluation. One of the
conclusions from that study notes the following:
For many defense systems, the current operational testing paradigm restricts the
application of statistical techniques and thereby reduces their potential benefits by
preventing the integration of all available and relevant information for use in
planning and carrying out tests and in making production decisions. This
paradigm is was noted as the major players in the acquisition process – the
program manager, test organization, the contractor, user, and Congress – have
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very different (and sometimes competing) perspectives on how knowledge is
applied. As a result, even in those situations where knowledge is available that
could be used to make good programmatic decisions; those that are involved in
the decision-making process may be pressured to do otherwise. (p.47)

Boehm, Port, Huang, and Brown (2002) created a spatial model that can be used to
generate several acquisition models related to user satisfaction, cost, and quality
constraints. The models take into account the expectations of key stakeholders, system
requirements, system features, and development procedures. The models require a great
deal of knowledge from all stakeholders involved in the development process. In their
study, this model was used on 26 University of Southern California projects. The results
showed that 24 out of 26 projects were successful in terms of meeting cost, schedule, and
performance objectives. The importance of these results is that they show that
knowledge-based decision support models could possibly be used effectively for DoD
acquisitions.
Application of RAND’s Decision Framework: National Security Agency
In 2006, the RAND Corporation partnered with the Intelligence Support Systems
(ISS) division at the National Security Administration to pilot RAND’s Portfolio
Management (PortMan) Decision Framework. The framework can be used for Research
and Development (R&D) projects or Operations and Maintenance (O&M) projects. The
purpose of the model is to assess the Expected Value of a group of actual or proposed
projects.
The Expected Value can then be used as knowledge upon which to make
decisions that maximize the value of R&D funding for a portfolio. RAND’s PortMan
model computes the Expected Value of a R&D project from two primary knowledge
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factors: value of successful implementation and the probability of successful
implementation. The value of successful implementation is based on the value of the
capability to the organization and the extent to which the performance potential matches
the resources required to achieve the capability. The probability of successful
implementation is a measure of the risk associated with implementing an R&D project or
sustaining an O&M project (RAND, 2004). The Expected Value (EV) of a project is
defined as the Value of Successful Implementation multiplied by the Probability of
Successful Implementation.
For this particular study, RAND (2006) developed two different sets of metrics
for estimating the Expected Value. They created one set for R&D projects and another
set for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) projects. A total of 17 projects were
evaluated in the pilot study. To estimate the three factors for the Expected Value, RAND
performed a Delphi exercise using the members of the ISS’s Senior Leadership Group
(SLG). The SLG were senior decision-makers in the ISS organization. Each SLG
member was given a series of questions and a ranking scale to provide answers. After
several rounds to reach consensus, the answers were converted to a numeric score and
averaged to provide values for the Expected Value (RAND, 2006).
The results of the RAND study concluded that the ranking of projects using the
decision model was significantly different than the ranking from the ISS methodology,
which was based on undocumented metrics. RAND (2006) concluded the following: the
RAND PortMan model can be effectively applied to both R&D and O&M portfolio
decisions and the model can be used for both near-term (single fiscal year) decisions and
as well as long-term decisions.
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Chapter III. Methodology

This investigation used a qualitative research methodology to answer the research
questions offered in the first chapter. The rationale for using qualitative methods was
based on the fact that three different information types were gathered: (1) secondary data
consisting of survey responses to open-ended questions, (2) knowledge required by either
federal statute or Department of Defense (DoD) regulation at key decision points, and (3)
knowledge-based decision-making best practices. The second and third information
types were obtained through the literature review.
This chapter includes four main sections. The first section provides an overview
of the thesis research methodology. The second discusses the survey effort, while the
third section describes how data reduction was performed to analyze content. Finally, the
fourth section summarizes the method used to compare information types and identify
themes represented within the data by describing the assessment model.

Overall Research Methodology
The overall research approach followed the nine-step framework proposed by
Buchanan (1980) as shown in Figure 6. Additionally, Booth, Colomb, and Williams
(2003) suggest that an extensive research topic is selected and then confined to develop a
manageable thesis statement. In that regard, this research focused on “knowledge-based
decision-making,” which was then was confined to “knowledge-based decision-making
in DoD acquisition.” As stated in Chapter I, the following investigative questions were
subsequently established.

26

1. What are the critical pieces of information that are required for an informed
decision at key decision points in the acquisition process?
2. How does the currently available information (contained in required decision
products) compare to what is needed for decisions with regard to technology,
design, and production knowledge for each of the key decision points in the
acquisition process?
3. What is the effect of this resulting lack of information on DoD acquisition
programs?
4. Can this effect be quantified in terms of cost, schedule, and performance?

Figure 6. Research Methodology (Buchanan, 1980)

27

This chapter thus focuses on steps five and six of Buchanan’s (1980) framework:
data collection and data analysis. Step five (data collection) involved both secondary
data and extraction of data from existing documents. Step six (data analysis) consisted of
three parallel activities adopted from the analysis framework developed by Miles and
Huberman (1994). The framework describes the major phases of data analysis as data
reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification. Figure 7 illustrates the
data analysis framework.

Figure 7. Data Analysis Framework (Miles and Huberman, 1994)

Survey Effort
For this research effort, the survey data was obtained from SAF/ACPO (Air Force
Acquisition Chief Process Office). SAF/ACPO, in conjunction with the Center for
Reengineering and Enabling Technology (CRET), was charged with reviewing and
validating the GAO findings primarily with regard to knowledge-based decision support
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and improving the fidelity of acquisition decision-making within the U.S. Air Force.
SAF/ACPO chose senior-level personnel from across the Air Force acquisition
community. All personal identifiable information was removed from the data before it
was used for this research.
Survey Construction
The questions asked during the survey are provided in Table 5. The questionnaire
provided to the participants was relatively short. The people solicited for this study are
senior acquisition officials with many responsibilities. Providing them with a long and
cumbersome interview that required a great deal of time would have likely resulted in
few, or possibly no, responses. Furthermore, with a few very direct and relevant
questions, it can be possible to get directly to the core of the issues being researched and
not have to deal with a great deal of information and data that may have little or no
relevancy to the research problem being addressed.
The questions shown in Table 5 were chosen for inclusion in the survey because
they allowed the participants to provide information about the type of knowledge that is
used in the decision-making process, how other stakeholders are involved in the process,
and whether additional knowledge sets would be considered valuable in the acquisition
process. These questions provided a means for not only gaining insight into the
knowledge set in decision-making process, but also how that knowledge set is used to
make decisions.
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Table 5. Survey Questions

1. Does your organization have any ongoing initiatives that address GAO findings?
If so, what is the initiative and what is its purpose?
2. What major decision product(s) does your organization create? (A decision product
is defined as any object (report, review, plan, document package, database update, etc.)
that is used to make an Acquisition Decision. These items include Budget Execution
Documentation, Justification Documents, Monthly Acquisition Reports, etc. Items that
we are not looking to identify are Weekly Reports, Org Status Reports, etc.)

3. Who are the customer(s) of these decision product(s)?
4. What decision product(s) do you receive?
5. What are the source(s) or supplier(s) of these products?
6. What feedback does your organization receive from your customer(s)?
7. What feedback does/would your organization give to your suppliers(s)?
8. What acquisition decision(s) does your customer(s) make relative to the decision
product(s) your organization provides to them? (An Acquisition Decision is an event
that yields an outcome that has an impact on another organization or ACAT designated
program within the Acquisition Lifecycle).

9. What acquisition decision(s) does your organization make relative to the decision
product(s)?
10. What is the intent of the decision product? Does the decision product meet its
intended purpose?
11. What information products do you believe that your organization should receive
(missing information) that would improve your acquisition decision making
process?
12. What information products does your organization receive that are non-value
added in the acquisition decision making process?
13. What Regulations and Policies require that your organization creates these
products?
14. Do you use an IT System to create/retrieve a decision product? If so, what is its
name?
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Survey Administration
The survey instrument was sent to the participants with an explanation of the
research being conducted and how their assistance would help with the project. The
participants were asked to respond to the questions and send the information back to
SAF/ACPO. In all instances, the questions were either answered in electronic format and
returned to SAF/ACPO via email or answered via teleconference.
Population of Interest
The sample population for this study consisted of 12 acquisition decision-makers
in the U.S. Air Force. While this may seem like a relatively low sample, it is much larger
than was expected and provides a great deal of information that can be analyzed from
within a single acquisition organization. The population size of the ACAT I and II
acquisition milestone decision-makers within the Air Force is relatively small. Figure 8
offers a view of the number of Acquisition Category (ACAT) IC and II programs with
regard to the milestone decision authorities as of FY09. ACAT I programs are estimated
by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)
(USD(AT&L)) to require eventual expenditure for Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E) funding of more than $365 million (Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 constant
dollars) or procurement of more than $2.19 billion (FY 2000 constant dollars). ACAT II
programs are estimated by the DoD Component Head to require eventual expenditure for
RDT&E of more than $140 million in FY 2000 constant dollars, or for procurement of
more than $660 million in FY 2000 constant dollars.
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Figure 8. USAF Acquisition Programs by MDA Type (FY09)

The number of Air Force ACAT IC and II programs is 17 and 25, respectively. Of these
42 programs, the 12 participants were the milestone decision authority for 23 programs.
What is also important is that the information obtained from these participants was
complete in terms of answering all of the questions in the questionnaire. In addition, the
participants often included their own comments or opinions. It should be noted that the
actual people completing the surveys were individuals that are the decision-makers
within their respective acquisition organization and not support personnel. All of the
respondents were civilians or military members of the rank O-6/GS-15 or above.

Data Reduction and Content Analysis
Within the Miles and Huberman (1994) framework, the researcher used Microsoft
Excel as a means for data reduction to analyze content for all three sets of data. The first
set of data analyzed was the program knowledge products required by either federal
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statute or DoD regulation at Key Decision Points. The initial step was to create a matrix
that captured all knowledge products and indicated whether each one was required by
statute or regulation; the matrix also indicated to which Key Decision Point the
knowledge product is applicable. Table 6 shows a sample of the matrix.

Table 6. Program Knowledge Product Matrix

The next data reduction technique was to align the knowledge products to one (or
more) of five key program parameters: Requirements, Cost, Schedule, Technical
Performance, and Funding. This enabled the researcher to group the knowledge support
products according to the area in which they provide decision support. It also facilitated
the elimination of knowledge products that did not support one of the aforementioned
program parameters. Table 7 shows a sample of the Knowledge Products and their
alignment with five key program parameters.
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Table 7. Knowledge Products Alignment with Knowledge Areas

The next data reduction technique was performed on both the Knowledge
Products and the GAO’s knowledge-based decision-making best practices. This
technique helped the researcher align the knowledge products with best practices
according to the GAO: technology maturity, design stability, and production maturity.
Since the Knowledge Points are limited to requirements, design, and technical aspects of
programs, this alignment helped the researcher further reduce the number of knowledge
products to use in the research. Table 8 shows how Knowledge Products are aligned with
Knowledge Points.

Table 8. Alignment of Knowledge Products and Knowledge Points
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The final data reduction techniques were performed on the answers from the
questionnaire. The respondents were asked 14 total questions, but only three questions
were applicable to this research. However, the respondents’ answers to the remaining 11
questions were taken into consideration for recommendations made at the conclusion of
this research. The following three questions were used for this research:
1. What is the intent of the decision product? Does the decision product meet its
intended purpose?
2. What information products do you believe that your organization should
receive (missing information) that would improve your acquisition decisionmaking process?
3. What information products does your organization receive that are non-value
added in the acquisition decision-making process
The answers to these questions were analyzed and all comments that referred to any
decision support product were extracted and aligned with the appropriate decision
product.
For the first question, the assumption made for this research was if the knowledge
product cannot meet its intended purpose, then it also cannot effectively support
decisions based on its intended purpose. Question 1a (What is the intent of the decision
product?) was not used unless the comments supported answers given in other questions.
Question 1b solicited a binary response (“YES” or “NO” unless the respondent left this
answer blank) and the responses were recorded in the matrix. Table 9, on the following
page, shows a sample of the respondents’ answers to Question 1b.
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Table 9. Knowledge Products Aligned with Survey Results (Question 1b)

Questions 2 and 3 offered the respondents the opportunity to share which
knowledge products they thought are missing and those which are non-value added,
respectively. Question 2 captured the knowledge products that could improve their
decision-making abilities. There were very few responses in this area. The researcher
compared this list of knowledge products with those mandated by law or regulation. If it
was listed and required by law or regulation, then the answer was ignored. Question 3
solicited the non-value added knowledge products in the acquisition process. If any
knowledge product was listed as non-value added by the majority of the respondents
(seven or more) and not required by law or regulation, then that knowledge product was
not included in this research.

Comparison of Information Types
Miles and Huberman (1994) describe data reduction activity as the process of
choosing, simplifying, and changing the data that is obtained in the research process. To
analyze the data and help answer the research questions, a scoring assessment matrix was

36

created. This assessment focused on the relationship of the information required by
statute and regulation to key program parameters: requirements, cost, schedule,
performance, and program funding. It also took into consideration the responses from the
questionnaire that addressed the importance of the decision support information.
Assessment Model
The assessment was accomplished at six key decision points in the acquisition
process: Materiel Development Decision, Milestone A, Milestone B, Post Critical
Design Review – A, Milestone C, and the Full Rate Production Decision Review. This
assessment used a scoring schema to rate the decision support for each decision. In
addition to reducing the data, this research altered some responses without changing the
intent of the individual surveyed. This was accomplished to make data more
manageable.
The assessment model is based on four criteria statements. Each statement has
three possible criteria responses. To assess each area based on the responses, a score was
assigned to each response. If the response was ‘YES’, then a ‘+1’ was scored for that
particular statement. If the response was ‘NO’, then a ‘-1’ was scored for that particular
statement. If the response was ‘Not Applicable’, then a ‘0’ was scored for that statement.
Table 10 shows the statements, responses, and corresponding scores. Table 11 shows an
example of the scoring schema for one Decision Support Product (DSP).
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Table 10. Knowledge Assessment Criteria Statements and Responses

Table 11. Knowledge Area Assessment Scoring Example

Decision support products selected for the knowledge assessments were based on
the products most frequently used by the decision-makers responding to the
questionnaire. Each decision support product was rated in accordance with the score for
each knowledge area. Each decision support product can score a maximum of 4 points
and a minimum of -4 points, where positive numbers indicate better decision support.
Table 12 shows the scoring schema for decision support products.
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Table 12. Scoring Schema for Assessment Model

Score

Assessment

GREEN

2.50 – 4.00

Decision Support Product is available and provides
adequate information to make informed decision

YELLOW

0.01 – 2.49

Decision Support Products are either not applicable or
more information is needed to make informed
decision

RED

- 4.00 – 0.00

Additional decision support is needed

The last step in using the model is to assess each knowledge area based on the
individual decision support products. This research used a quantitative method to assign
scores. The score for each knowledge area was computed by averaging the individual
scores of the decision support products. Table 13 provides an example of a knowledge
area assessment.

Table 13. Example of Knowledge Area Assessment

The next activity of the data analysis framework is verification and validity.
Miles and Huberman (1994) stated that in this phase, the data should be tested for
creditability and validility. In this phase, as Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest, before
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drawing conclusions from the data, the research must again consider what the analyzed
data mean and then assess the implications toward the research question. In reviewing
the data, the researcher consistently asked the following question: does this research
method make sense? In this case, the researcher purposely kept the methods simple and
easy to understand. Also, any assumptions were clearly and distinctly indicated in the
research.
The final step is addressing what Miles and Huberman (1994) calls the pragmatic
validity. Although formed in the academic setting, qualitative research should be one
that can be extended to other environments. The researcher sought to focus on ensuring
that the research conducted can be utilized outside of the academic environment.
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Chapter IV. Data Analysis

The intent of this chapter is to present the analysis of the data gathered during this
research. As previously discussed, the data was derived from three separate sources. All
three were used to create an assessment model for knowledge areas supporting the six
major decision points in the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition process. Decision
support products in the following six knowledge areas were assessed: program
requirements, cost, schedule, performance, funding, and strategy. The knowledge
support assessment results were based on the statutory/regulatory requirement, answers
provided by acquisition decision makers with regard to how well the products met their
intended purpose and if the product was needed to make decisions, and the alignment of
the knowledge products with best practices. The subsequent sections present the analysis
in greater detail.

Knowledge Area: Program Requirements
The first knowledge area assessed in this research was program requirements.
The Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), Capability Development Document (CDD), and
Capability Production Document (CPD) are the primary capability documents that
provide decision support in this knowledge area. These documents capture the
requirements for which an acquisition program is based. Decisions made in the
acquisition process should support filling the capability gap being addressed in the
capability document. Figure 9 shows the interrelationship of the requirements process
and the acquisition process.
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Figure 9. Interrelationship of the Requirements Process and the Acquisition Process
(Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2009)

Capability Documents
Since the knowledge contained within capability documents serve as the basis for
acquisition efforts, it was an area that was expected to score well in the assessment.
Capability documents are required by regulation at every major decision point in the
acquisition process. Nine respondents indicated that requirements documents met their
intended purpose. However, two stated that it is not always clear if the capability
documents (in particular the Initial Capability Document) are compliant with the DoD
Architectural Framework (DoDAF). The DoDAF is a reference model to organize the
enterprise architecture (EA) and systems architecture into complementary and consistent
views. In addition, although compliancy is required, the benefit of being compliant is not
well understood in the acquisition community. In their comments, the respondents stated
that the acquisition community is typically not an active participant in the requirements
generation process because it is not transparent to them how the systems being acquired
fit into the overall DoD framework.
Capability documents scored an average of 4 (out of a max score of 4) for this
knowledge area. This score reflects the importance, availability, and use of requirements
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in making decisions in the acquisition process. Requirements documents ranked as the
number one decision support product for knowledge support in this research. This
indicates that the products are available and provide useful information that is used to
make decisions in the program requirements knowledge area. Table 14 shows the results
of the scoring in by each decision point.

Table 14. Capability Documents Knowledge Assessment

Scope Evolution
Scope evolution is the next decision support document supporting the program
requirement knowledge area. Scope evolution documents capture changes in program
requirements prior to Milestone B (particularly before a program is formally baselined
with an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB)). This knowledge support was referred to
by nine respondents. All nine indicated that stability of capability requirements
(performance or quantity) is critical to program success as changes in requirements
impact program cost and schedule. There is no statutory or regulatory document required
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for a scope evolution document. However, all changes to Key Performance Parameters
in the APB (established after Milestone B) are tracked by all MDAP programs.
Three respondents indicated an issue with changes in requirements prior to
Milestone B. The issue is that changes to requirements after a program has started are
costly. Additionally, one respondent stated that the “appetite for the latest and greatest
technology is eating our lunch, when a lesser, more mature technology is sufficient.”
This is consistent with the results of a RAND Corporation study conducted in 2006. For
every type of ship they studied, the price escalation rates ranged from 7 to 11 percent
annually between 1950 and 2000. For every type of aircraft that was examined, the price
escalation rates ranged from 7 to 12 percent annually between 1974 and 2005. Since the
average annual inflation rate between 1965 and 2004 was 4.7%, RAND (2006) concluded
that the price growth above the inflation index stemmed from the desire for more
capabilities.
Four respondents suggested that more programs follow an incremental acquisition
strategy that locks program requirements at Milestone A. They went on to state that any
change (increase) in requirements should be acquired through separate increments. This
approach is limited, however, to the manner in which the capabilities are required by the
user. For example, capability documents may not separate requirements into increments,
thus forcing the acquisition community to acquire most if not all capabilities for a
program at once.
Scope evolution documents scored an -1. This low score is not indicative of the
value of the knowledge product, but rather an indication that the knowledge is not
required by statute or regulation. This score indicates that more knowledge is needed to
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support decisions in this knowledge area. These decision support documents are aligned
with both Knowledge Point 1: Requirements and Technology Capability are Matched and
Knowledge Point 2: Design will work as required. Table 15, on the following page,
shows the scoring of this assessment area.

Table 15. Scope Evolution Knowledge Assessment

Knowledge Area: Program Cost
This knowledge area focuses on program cost for DoD major acquisition
programs. There are many documents used by the individual services that support this
knowledge, including the initial proposals submitted by industry partners. In addition,
each service produces a cost estimate usually referred to as the Service Cost Position.
However, this research focused on the two documents that are mandated by statute or
regulation: the Independent Cost Estimate and the Affordability Assessment.
Independent Cost Estimate
The Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) estimates the full life-cycle cost for a
MDAP; required by statute, it is prepared by the Director of Cost Assessment and
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Program Evaluation (DCAPE). The ICE is required at Milestones A, B, and C. The ICE
was commented on by 11 respondents. All indicated that the document supported
decisions, but nine acknowledged that cost estimating is an issue for MDAPs. The issue
as directly stated by seven respondents is that costs are routinely underestimated.
These statements are supported by a 2008 RAND study pertaining to the sources
of cost growth in MDAPs. In the study (RAND, 2008), 68 programs were examined over
the previous 30 years. They found that after adjusting for changes in the quantity of
systems produced, costs grew by 46 percent on average over the estimate at development
approval (Milestone B). Since the respondents stated that this decision support document
was historically underestimated, the product was assessed as not meeting its intent.
Overall, the ICE was assessed with a score of 2. Table 16 shows the scoring of this
decision support product.

Table 16. Independent Cost Estimate Knowledge Assessment

Affordability Assessment
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The next document, which is required at Milestones B and C, assessed in the
program cost knowledge area is the Affordability Assessment. The intent of this
document is to demonstrate that the program’s projected funding and manpower are
practical and attainable. This knowledge support area was addressed by ten respondents,
all indicating that it met its purpose. Seven respondents’ comments were focused on the
staffing level of program offices prior to Milestone B, which is when major acquisition
efforts are designated as programs. The comments suggested that Pre-Milestone B
programs are ill-equipped to be successful at this stage because the staffing level is too
low in comparison to the workload. For this reason, it was recommended that this
document be mandated for Milestone A. Table 17 shows the scoring of this decision
support product.

Table 17. Affordability Assessment Knowledge Assessment

Knowledge Area: Program Schedule
This research assessed two key documents supporting the schedule knowledge
area. The first document is the Integrated Master Schedule (IMS). The IMS is an
integrated, networked schedule containing all the details necessary to accomplish the
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work specified in the Integrated Master Plan (IMP), which is the second document
assessed. Since both documents are closely related, both were be assessed together.
While the IMS is not required by statute or regulation as a standalone document in the
acquisition process, both the acquisition strategy and the APB address schedule
parameters for MDAPs.
Integrated Master Schedule
All 12 respondents commented on program schedule. Eleven specifically stated
that it is a value-added document for the decision-making process. However, four
respondents made comments indicating that the government is too dependent on the
defense partners for “detailed schedule information.” Two of these comments were
based on experiences in which schedule risks were not reported by the contractor until
they became issues for the government. Additionally, five respondents indicated that
IMS information is, at times, too complex to be used to make decisions.
Integrated Master Plan
The IMP is the next document that supports the schedule knowledge area. Like
the IMS, it is not required by statute or regulation. The IMS is an event-based plan
detailed in a hierarchy of work events. None of the respondents made comments
specifically with regard to the IMP. However, nine made mention of a program’s critical
path, which was determined to be a key information source for making decisions. Since
the IMP contains all program tasks, this research inferred that the respondents deemed the
IMP as meeting its purpose. Both the IMS and IMP are aligned with Knowledge Point 3:
Design can be produced within, cost, schedule, and quality targets. Table 18 shows the
scoring for these decision support products.
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Table 18. Integrated Master Schedule/Plan Knowledge Assessment

Knowledge Area: Technical Performance
Six decision support products were assessed for program performance: Systems
Engineering Plan (SEP), Consideration for Technology Issues, Test and Evaluation
Strategy (TES), Independent Technology Readiness Assessment (ITRA), Technical
Readiness Assessment (TRA), and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). All six
of these documents are required by either statute or regulation. For purposes of this
research, the ITRA and the TRA will be considered the same document and scored
similarly. Similarly, Test and Evaluation Strategy (TES) and the Test and Evaluation
Master Plan (TEMP) were considered together.
Systems Engineering Plan
The System Engineering Plan (SEP) is the next knowledge support document
assessed for this research. The SEP’s purpose is to guide programs in their systems
engineering approach, while providing a documented technical foundation for the
program. It documents key technical risks, processes, resources, and metrics associated
with the program. The SEP was commented on by all 12 respondents. All indicated that
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it was a document that met its intent in supporting decisions. However, only three
respondents felt that the SEP provided information that was needed to make decisions.
Eight respondents felt that the most important attribute of the SEP is the success
criteria for the technical reviews. These comments aligned well with the best practices
found by the GAO (Knowledge Point 2: Design can be work as required), which uses the
percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for completion by the Critical
Design Review as one critical success factor. Four respondents made comments
regarding the standardization of the SEP. They stated that the lack of a mandated format
made it difficult to use for making program decisions. Table 19 shows the scoring for
this knowledge support document.

Table 19. Systems Engineering Plan Knowledge Assessment

Consideration for Technology Issues
Consideration for Technology Issues is the second decision support document
assessed for this area. It is required by statute at Milestones A and B. The law mandates
that programs provide documentation regarding the use of relevant technologies.
Therefore, programs must address whether or not relevant technologies exist. They also
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must prove the rationale for choosing to not use technologies if they exist. Lastly, the
program must document existing relevant technologies that will be incorporated into the
program.
Ten respondents commented on this knowledge support product. Eight stated that
this document did not add value to the decision-making process. Of those eight, six
stated that the intent of the document is captured in other required documentation. Two
respondents stated that they did not understand the purpose of the document. As a result,
this document was considered to be one that did not meet its intent. Furthermore, this
knowledge support document is not aligned with any of the Knowledge Points. Table 20
shows the scoring for this area.

Table 20. Consideration for Technology Issues Knowledge Assessment

Technology Readiness Assessment
The next decision support documents supporting the technical performance area
were the Independent Technology Readiness Assessment (ITRA) and Technology
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Readiness Assessment (TRA). Both documents have the same intent. The difference is
that the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 allows the
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) to, in addition to the TRA,
require an additional independent assessment of the technology readiness.
The law also required DDR&E to develop a knowledge-based standard against
which Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) can be assessed. The law mandated the
integration of risk of critical technologies at key stages in the acquisition process. The
TRA is required at Milestone B and at Milestone C. Nine respondents commented on the
TRA, with all comments indicating that the decision support document met its intended
purpose and that the information provided by the document was needed to make
decisions. Table 21 shows the scoring for these documents.

Table 21. Technology Readiness Assessment Knowledge Assessment

Test and Evaluation Strategy/Test and Evaluation Master Plan
The last two documents supporting this knowledge area are the Test and
Evaluation Strategy (TES) and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). The intent
of both documents is very similar. The TES describes the approach for test and
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evaluation for programs prior to Milestone B. The TEMP, which evolves from the TES,
documents the overall structure and objectives for the test and evaluation program
beyond Milestone B. Both documents are required by regulation. All 12 respondents
made comments indicating that these documents met their respective purpose. However,
only five indicated that they were needed to make decisions. Four of the five stated that
test and evaluation results, rather than the plan itself, was useful in making decisions.
These documents are aligned with Knowledge Point 2: Design will work as required.
Table 22 shows the assessment for these documents.

Table 22. Test and Evaluation Knowledge Assessment

Knowledge Area: Funding
The next knowledge area deals with program funding. Like the cost knowledge
area, there are several different products supporting this knowledge area. Most of the
funding products produce similar information; therefore, this research focused on only
two decision support documents: the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) certification
at Milestone A and the Non-Advocate Cost Assessment, which is a document primarily
used by the Air Force acquisition community.
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Milestone Decision Authority Certification
The MDA certification memorandum is required by the Weapons Systems
Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 for all MDAPs at Milestone A. The
WSARA required the MDA to sign a memorandum for record that certifies the following
program attributes:
1. Program fulfills an approved ICD, executed by competent entity.
2. Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) has been performed, and cost estimate is
complete.
3. If the program exceeds 25% of the cost or schedule target prior to Milestone B,
then program termination must be considered.
At the time of the survey, the WSARA of 2009 was not signed into law.
However, all 12 respondents had knowledge of the upcoming law and provided
comments. For this reason, the answers provided may have been skewed since their
answers may not have been based on factual information regarding MDA certification.
All 12 respondents felt this ‘Nunn-McCurdy’ like process was being conducted too early
in the program life. One respondent stated that in the early stages of the acquisition
process, scope is still being defined based on funding, cost, technology maturity, and
initial requirements; therefore, the program should not be baselined. Another respondent
said this will lead programs to artificially inflate their cost and schedule estimates in
order to avoid breaching the threshold. None of the respondents indicated that this
document added any value to the decision-making process. This document is aligned
with Knowledge Point 3: Design can be produced within cost, schedule, and quality
targets. Table 23 shows the scoring for this decision support document.
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Table 23. Milestone Decision Authority Certification Knowledge Assessment

Non-Advocate Cost Assessment
The Non-Advocate Cost Assessment (NACA) is an analysis of a program’s cost,
price, and technical risk. The primary assessment compares the cost of a program with
the program’s FYDP budget and assesses whether the program can be successful within
its cost targets. It is prepared by an independent organization. Ten respondents stated
that they use NACAs when making decisions, which indicates that the document meets
its intended purpose. The NACA is aligned with Knowledge Point 3: Design can be
produced within cost, schedule, and quality targets. Table 24 shows the scoring for this
decision support product.

Table 24. Non-Advocate Cost Assessment Knowledge Assessment
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Knowledge Areas: Program Strategy
The decision support documents supporting this knowledge area are those that
provide the overall strategy that will achieve the cost, schedule, and technical
performance objectives of the program. These documents are the Technology
Development Strategy (TDS), Acquisition Strategy, Acquisition Program Baseline
(APB), and the Life-Cycle Support Plan (LCSP). All four documents are required by
either statute or regulation.
Acquisition Strategy
The first decision support product in this knowledge area is the Acquisition
Strategy. The Acquisition Strategy is the all-inclusive plan that provides the acquisition
approach and describes the overall strategy for the program management team to manage
risks to meet program goals. The Acquisition Strategy is required by regulation for
Milestone B and beyond. This document was commented on by all of the respondents
that it met its purpose. Additionally, nine made comments indicated that this document
provided essential knowledge in making decisions. This document is aligned with
Knowledge Point 3: Design can be produced within cost, schedule, and quality targets.
Table 25 gives the assessment score for the Acquisition Strategy.
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Table 25. Acquisition Strategy Knowledge Assessment

Technology Development Strategy
The TDS, which is required by statute, is the document that guides acquisition
efforts in the Technology Development phase. Its function is very similar to the
Acquisition Strategy. All 12 respondents offered indications that it met its intent in
supporting the decision-making process. Additionally, seven of the respondents stated
that TDS should be updated more frequently within the Technology Development stage.
Four of the seven reasoned that if a technology is proven to be not mature enough to meet
cost and schedule parameters, then tradeoffs need to be made as soon as possible to avoid
cost and schedule overruns. The TDS supports Knowledge Point 1: Requirements and
Technology Capability are matched. Table 26 shows the assessment for this knowledge
area.
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Table 26. Technology Development Strategy Knowledge Assessment

Acquisition Program Baseline
The next assessed document which supports the program strategy knowledge area
is the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB). The establishment of program goals is
required by statute beginning at Milestone B. The purpose of the APB is to document
program goals in terms of cost, schedule, and technical performance. These goals are
made of up of an objective value and a threshold value for each Key Performance
Parameter (KPP) or Key System Attribute (KSA). Eleven of the 12 respondents
commenting on the APB indicated that it added value to the decision-making process,
thus meeting its intent. Nine respondents made comments that the APB is needed to
make decisions. The APB is aligned with Knowledge Point 3: Design can be produced
within cost, schedule, and quality targets. Table 27 provides the assessment score for the
APB.
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Table 27. Acquisition Program Baseline Knowledge Assessment

Life Cycle Support Plan
The last document supporting the program strategy area is the Life Cycle Support
Plan (LCSP). The LCSP documents the program’s strategy to achieving performanceoriented product support capability. The LCSP is required by DoD Directive 5000.01 to
“implement performance-based logistics strategies that optimize total system availability
while minimizing cost and logistics footprint.” Although life-cycle sustainment planning
begins earlier in the acquisition process, the LCSP is mandated by Milestone B.
The LCSP was commented on by 11 of the respondents, indicating that it met its
intent. Eight stated that the LCSP contained information that could be useful in making
decisions. However, three acknowledged that the information in the LCSP was actually
seldom used to make decisions. Four of the respondents made statements suggesting that
logistical planning should play a larger role in the overall acquisition strategy for
programs. However, they felt that the acquisition community lacks the right skills to
effectively plan for logistical activities. This decision support document does not directly
align with any of the GAO Knowledge Points. Table 28 shows the assessment for the
LCSP.
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Table 28. Life Cycle Support Plan Knowledge Assessment

Overall Assessment of Knowledge Areas
The last step in using the model is to assess each knowledge area based on the
individual decision support products. This research used a quantitative method by
averaging the individual scores of the decision support products. Table 29 shows the
assessment results.
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Table 29. Assessment of Knowledge Areas
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Chapter V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Cost overruns and schedule delays have plagued Major Defense Acquisition
Programs (MDAPs) within the Department of Defense (DoD) for decades. There are
several factors that impact an acquisition program’s performance, including the decisions
made by defense officials. This research focused on one aspect of decision-making:
knowledge support. Secondary interview data, assessments of knowledge support
documents, and how these documents align with best practices for knowledge-based
decision-making helped address the investigative questions posed by this research.

Results
This research posed four investigative questions. By exploring previous research,
gathering and analyzing data, and drawing conclusions, this research has answered those
questions. The research outcomes are presented for each question.
What are the critical pieces of information that are required for an informed decision at
key decision points in the acquisition process?
The research answered this investigative question by establishing which
documents were needed to make decisions. The required information, according to the
respondents, was considered to be stated in products that adequately addressed one of six
key knowledge areas of an acquisition program: Requirements, Cost, Schedule,
Technical Performance, Funding, and Strategy. This research focused on 17 decision
support documents that directly supported these knowledge areas. However, based on the
feedback from respondents, two documents were eliminated. The Milestone Decision
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Authority (MDA) Certification and the Consideration for Technology Issues were not
considered value-added to the decision-making process. Table 30 shows the list of
critical decision support products.

Table 30. Critical Decision Support Products

How does the currently available information (contained in required decision products)
compare to what is needed for decisions with regard to technology, design, and
production knowledge for each of the key decision points in the acquisition process?
This investigative question dealt with the alignment of the DoD acquisition
process with best practices identified by the General Accounting Office (GAO) (2008).
The research indicated that there is in fact an alignment of knowledge mandated with the
GAO Knowledge Points. For every Knowledge Point, there are decision support
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products required by law or regulation aligned to it. Additionally, this research has
concluded that alignment with this best practice has not always translated into better
program performance.
Best practices in decision support outside of the knowledge products should also
be considered. For example, one metric the GAO uses to assess program knowledge is
the average percent of design drawings completed by the Critical Design Review.
Although readily available, this data is not required by statute or regulation for any
decision support product. Since the format of most required documents is not dictated, it
is possible that this data is captured. Therefore, the alignment of the knowledge cannot
be determined conclusively.
What is the effect of lack of key information on DoD acquisition programs?
This research defined key information on DoD acquisition programs in two ways.
The first were the instances in which key information is defined by best practices. As
previously mentioned, the GAO (2008) uses metrics to assess program knowledge. As
such, knowledge supporting these metrics can be considered key information per best
practices. However, this research did not specifically address the alignment of decision
support documents and the information supporting the metrics. Therefore, the effect of
the lack of key information supporting the GAO metrics is unknown.
The second definition of key information is the knowledge contained in decision
support products determined by decision-makers as being needed to make decisions. In
this regard, if key information is missing, then the effect is simply that decision-makers
cannot make a well-informed decision. As an example, the research identified the Scope
Evolution Document as key missing information. At least one comment from the
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respondents indicated that information in this document could be used to make better
decisions regarding tradeoffs in terms of cost, schedule, and technical performance.
Can this effect be quantified in terms of program cost, schedule, and technical
performance?
It is not clear if missing information can be quantified in terms of cost, schedule,
and technical performance as there are so many factors that impact these program
parameters. The literature review did reveal that National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) implemented policy supporting the GAO’s best practices in
knowledge-based decision-making and the results showed there were no improvements in
cost and schedule for those projects.

Recommendations
Based on the information that has been reviewed, it is possible to make several
recommendations to improve the use of knowledge-based decision-making in DoD
acquisitions. These recommendations are based directly on the information obtained
from the participants completing the surveys used in this study, as well as from the
information obtained by reviewing literature. It is important to note that these
recommendations are not intended to imply that the DoD acquisition process is
completely inefficient or should be completely changed. Instead, these recommendations
are made as a way to improve the decision-making process and to bring about greater
efficiency in the work that is done to acquire new systems for the DoD by its acquisition
teams, suppliers, and other stakeholders.
Recommendation #1
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The first recommendation is to further this study by exploring ways to improve
the score of the knowledge areas. This can be accomplishing by focusing on the drivers
for the low scores for decision support products. For example, the Non-Advocate Cost
Assessment (NACA) scored well in all areas with the exception of it not being mandatory
for major reviews. In this case, it means that it is considered valuable for decisionmakers but it has not been mandated. By mandating this knowledge product, it ensures
that all decision-makers will have access to valuable knowledge when making decisions.
Recommendation #2
The second recommendation is to use specific program metrics at reviews to
support decisions. For example, one metric the GAO recommends for the Critical Design
Review is the percentage of design drawings that are complete. This metric captures the
stability of the design. The literature review indicated that the higher the percentage of
drawings that are complete, the higher the probability of the design being capable of
meeting performance requirements. Additionally, a stable design in the early stages of
the development cycle reduces the risk of design changes. The respondents to the survey
also recommend another metric: changes in requirements (Scope Evolution). This
metric captures the stability of requirements, which helps keeps cost and schedule within
goals.
Recommendation #3
The next recommendation is that decision authorities should have more freedom
to request specific types of decision products. Aside from the decision products that are
required by statute and regulation, decision authorities should have the freedom to
request additional decision products when they believe that the information contained in

66

those products would be useful for a key decision. This freedom to have access to
additional decision products, or even decision products that are not routinely used or
made available to acquisition teams, would help to overcome the feelings that exist about
the lack of information when making a major decision for a program.
In addition to the decision authority, allowing other functional members of the
review board to specify decision products would also be of benefit. Rather than decision
products being shared between stakeholders that are viewed as being useless and not even
being thoroughly read, or even read at all, the ability to request specific decision products
would likely result in all stakeholders taking the documents that they receive more
seriously and using the information contained in those products in a more efficient
manner.
Recommendation #4
The next recommendation is to mandate a template for use during decision
briefings of major milestones. This template would contain a specific recommendation
for the milestone decision supported by knowledge within the mandated knowledge
support product. For example, the senior engineering functional would make a specific
recommendation to the decision authority with regard to technical performance. This
recommendation would be based on the knowledge gained from documents like the
Systems Engineering Plan and Independent Technology Readiness Document. This
would accomplish two important tasks. First, it would ensure the decisions are being
based on knowledge that is available and that mandated knowledge products are being
reviewed. Secondly, it would ensure that the decision support product is being
thoroughly reviewed for knowledge that can be used to make program decisions.
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Recommendation #5
Finally, it is recommended that the DoD create a standardized means by which
decision products across the department can be created and stored for use by all
programs, regardless of Acquisition Category (ACAT) level. One of the issues raised by
data collected from the participants in this study is that there is no standardized means by
which to create and store decision products. Instead, information is simply received and
stored in whatever way a specific team member may believe is best. This creates a
situation where efficiencies cannot be realized because programs are unable to share
information used to make decisions.
The creation or adoption of a single Information Technology system to
standardize the process of creating and storing decision products would help make the
use of decision products more engrained in the culture of the DoD. Having a
standardized process to handle decision products would be an indication to acquisition
teams that decision products are no longer viewed as something that can be read and then
forgotten about in the future. Instead, decision products could be collected and team
members could easily access the information contained in those products and gain a
feeling that the products are genuinely important and should be taken seriously.

Limitations
As with any research effort, this effort has limitations. The respondents to the survey
represented only the service’s acquisition community. Secondly, there is little
established research in this area. As such, the researcher does not have a point of
reference for the findings. Additionally, since some data sets were limited to the Air
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Force, the findings may not be applicable to other organizations within the DoD.
Another limitation is the fact that the researcher had to interpret the meaning of some
responses. This involved a combination of deductive and inductive analysis, which may
or may not have led to the true meaning of the submission by the individuals surveyed.
The final limitation is the aforementioned sample size of 12. Statistically, it is not a
significant number, but it represents a significant portion of the milestone decision
authorities for the Air Force.

Summary
Decision-making for acquisition programs is very important. The decisions that
are made not only affect the performance of a program but could also impact the lives of
Airman, Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines protecting our country. Analyzing the decision
support products is one method to improve the knowledge that is used to make decisions.
If these recommendations are put into place, the researcher believes that the acquisitions
process within the DoD would indeed be improved. While these recommendations may
seem relatively simplistic, they are based on actual issues that have been addressed by
active members of Air Force acquisition teams. By working to improve the efficiency of
the decision-making process, it will lead to better decisions for programs.
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Appendix A: Statutory Requirements for Milestone A

INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR APPLICABLE STATUTE, POLICY, AND
MILESTONE A
OTHER REFERENCES

Analysis of Alternatives

Subtitle III of title 40, U.S.C.
Section 2366a of Title 10, U.S.C.

Clinger-Cohen Act Compliance
(All IT–including National
Security Systems (NSS))

Subtitle III of title 40, U.S.C.

Consideration of Technology
Issues

Paragraph (b)(5) of Section 2364 of Title
10, U.S.C.

Cooperative Opportunities
(part of TDS)

Paragraph (e) of Section 2350a of Title 10,

U.S.C.

Data Management Strategy
(part of TDS)

Section 2320 of Title 10, U.S.C.

Independent Cost Estimate

Section 2434 of Title 10, U.S.C.

Market Research

Section 2377 of Title 10, U.S.C.
Paragraph (e)(2) of Section 644 of title 15,

U.S.C.
Milestone Decision Authority
Program Certification

Section 2366a of Title 10, U.S.C.
DoD Instruction 5000.02

Submission of a DD Form 1494
and Certification of Spectrum
Support

Sections 305 and 901 through 904 of title
47, U.S.C.
Section 104 of P.L. 102-538
Part 2 of OMB Circular A-11

Technology Development Strategy Section 803 of Public Law 107-314
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Appendix B: Regulatory Requirements for Milestone A

INFORMATION REQUIRED
FOR MILESTONE B

APPLICABLE REGULATION,
POLICY, AND OTHER
REFERENCES

Acquisition Decision
Memorandum

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Acquisition Information
Assurance Strategy (All IT–
including NSS)

DoD Instruction 8580.1
DoD Instruction 5000.02

DoD Component Cost Estimate
DoD Instruction 5000.02
(as required by Component
Acquisition Executive for MDAP)
Exit Criteria

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Initial Capabilities Document

CJCS Instruction 3170.01

Item Unique Identification
Implementation Plan

DoD Instruction 8320.04

Life-Cycle Signature Support Plan DoD Directive 5250.01
Net-Centric Data Strategy
(Approach summarized in TDS)

DoD Directive 8320.02

Program Protection Plan

DoD Instruction 5200.39

Systems Engineering Plan

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Test and Evaluation Strategy

DoD Instruction 5000.02
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Appendix C: Statutory Requirements for Milestone B

INFORMATION REQUIRED

FOR MILESTONE B

APPLICABLE STATUTE, POLICY,
AND OTHER REFERENCES

Acquisition Program Baseline
(APB)

Section 2435 of title 10, U.S.C.

Alternate Live Fire Test and
Evaluation (LFT&E) Plan

Section 2366 of title 10, U.S.C.

Analysis of Alternatives

Subtitle III of title 40, U.S.C.
Section 2366a of title 10, U.S.C.

Benefit Analysis and
Determination

Paragraph (e) of Section 644 of title 15,

U.S.C.

Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA)
Compliance

Subtitle III of title 40, U.S.C.

Competition Analysis

Section 2469 of title 10, U.S.C.

(part of Acquisition Strategy)
Consideration of Technology
Issues

Paragraph (b)(5) of Section 2364 of Title
10, U.S.C.

Cooperative Opportunities
(part of Acquisition Strategy)

U.S.C.

Paragraph (e) of Section 2350a of title 10,

Core Logistics Analysis/Source of Section 2464 of title 10, U.S.C.
Section 2466 of title 10, U.S.C.
Repair Analysis (part of
Acquisition Strategy)
Data Management Strategy
(part of Acquisition Strategy)

Section 2320 of title 10, U.S.C.
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Independent Cost Estimate (ICE)

Section 2434 of title 10, U.S.C.

Industrial Base Capabilities
Considerations

Section 2440 of title 10, U.S.C.

LFT&E Waiver from Full-up,

Section 2366 of title 10, U.S.C.

System-level Testing
Low-Rate Initial Production
Quantities

Section 2400 of title 10, U.S.C.

Manpower Estimate

Section 2434 of title 10, U.S.C.

Market Research

Section 2377 of Title 10, U.S.C.
Paragraph (e)(2) of Section 644 of title 15,

U.S.C.
Milestone Decision Authority
Program Certification

Section 2366b of title 10, U.S.C.
DoD Instruction 5000.02

Military Equipment Valuation

Public Law 101-576, SFFAS 6

Programmatic Environmental,
Safety and Occupational Health
Evaluation (PESHE)

Sections 4321-4347 of title 42, U.S.C.
E.O. 12114

Replaced System Sustainment Plan Section 2437 of title 10, U.S.C.
Selected Acquisition Report

Section 2432 of title 10, U.S.C.
Section 2445d of title 10, U.S.C.

Submission of a DD Form 1494
and Certification of Spectrum
Support

Sections 305 and 901-904 of title 47,
U.S.C.
Section 104 of Public Law 102-538
Part 2 of OMB Circular A-11
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Appendix D: Regulatory Requirements for Milestone B

APPLICABLE REGULATION,
POLICY, AND OTHER
REFERENCES

INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR

MILESTONE B

Acquisition Decision Memorandum

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Acquisition Information Assurance
Strategy

DoD Instruction 8580.1
DoD Instruction 5000.02

Acquisition Strategy

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Affordability Assessment

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Capability Development Document

CJCS Instruction 3170.01

Chief Information Officer
Confirmation of CCA Compliance

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Corrosion Plan

DoD Instruction 5000.67
DoD Instruction 5000.02

Cost Analysis Requirements
Description (CARD)

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Defense Acquisition Executive
Summary

DoD Instruction 5000.02

DoD Component Cost Estimate

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Exit Criteria

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Technology Readiness Assessment

DoD Instruction 5000.02
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Information Support Plan (ISP) (All
IT–including NSS)

DoD Directive 4630.05
DoD Instruction 4630.8

Initial Capabilities Document

CJCS Instruction 3170.01

Item Unique Identification
Implementation Plan

DoD Instruction 8320.04

Life-Cycle Signature Support Plan

DoD Directive 5250.01

Life-Cycle Sustainment Plan
(part of Acquisition Strategy)

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Net-Centric Data Strategy (Approach
detailed in ISP)

DoD Directive 8320.02

Operational Test Agency Report of
Operational Test and Evaluation
Results

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Preliminary Design Review Report

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Program Protection Plan

DoD Instruction 5200.39

Spectrum Supportability
Determination

DoD Directive 4650.1

System Threat Assessment Report
(STAR)

DoD Instruction 5000.02
DoD Directive 5105.21

Systems Engineering Plan

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Technology Readiness Assessment

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Test and Evaluation Master Plan

DoD Instruction 5000.02
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Appendix E: Statutory Requirements for Milestone C
INFORMATION REQUIRED
FOR MILESTONE C

APPLICABLE STATUTE, POLICY,
AND OTHER REFERENCES

Acquisition Program Baseline
(APB)

Section 2435 of title 10, U.S.C.

Analysis of Alternatives

Subtitle III of title 40, U.S.C.
Section 2366a of title 10, U.S.C.

Benefit Analysis and
Paragraph (e) of Section 644 of title 15,
U.S.C.
Determination (applicable to
bundled acquisitions only if no MS
B)) (part of Acquisition Strategy)
Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA)
Compliance
(All IT–including National
Security Systems (NSS))

Subtitle III of title 40, U.S.C.

Competition Analysis
(Depot-level Maintenance $3M
rule)
(part of Acquisition Strategy)
(If No MS B)

Section 2469 of title 10, U.S.C.

Consideration of Technology
Issues

Paragraph (b)(5) of Section 2364 of Title
10, U.S.C.

Cooperative Opportunities
(part of Acquisition Strategy)

Paragraph (e) of Section 2350a of title 10,

U.S.C.

Core Logistics Analysis/Source of Section 2464 of title 10, U.S.C.
Section 2466 of title 10, U.S.C.
Repair Analysis (part of
Acquisition Strategy)
Data Management Strategy

Section 2320 of title 10, U.S.C.

76

Independent Cost Estimate (ICE)

Section 2434 of title 10, U.S.C.

Industrial Base Capabilities
Considerations
(part of Acquisition Strategy)

Section 2440 of title 10, U.S.C.

Manpower Estimate (reviewed by Section 2434 of title 10, U.S.C.
the office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and
Readiness)
Section 2366a of title 10, U.S.C.
Milestone Decision Authority
Program Certification (If Program Section 2366b of title 10, U.S.C.
Initiation)
DoD Instruction 5000.02
Military Equipment Valuation
(part of Acquisition Strategy)

Public Law 101-576
Statement of Federal Financial Accounting
Standards No. 6

Sections 4321-4347 of title 42, U.S.C.
Programmatic Environmental,
Safety and Occupational Health
E.O. 12114
Evaluation (PESHE) (Including
National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) / Executive Order (E.O.)
12114 Compliance Schedule)
Submission of a DD Form 1494
and Certification of Spectrum
Support
(applicable to all
systems/equipment that use the
electromagnetic spectrum while
operating in the U.S. and its
possessions)

Sections 305 and 901-904 of title 47,

U.S.C.
Section 104 of Public Law 102-538
Part 2 of OMB Circular A-11
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Appendix F: Regulatory Requirements for Milestone C

INFORMATION REQUIRED

APPLICABLE REGULATION,
POLICY, AND OTHER
REFERENCES

FOR MILESTONE C

Acquisition Decision
Memorandum

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Acquisition Information Assurance DoD Instruction 8580.1
Strategy (All IT–including
DoD Instruction 5000.02
National Security Systems (NSS))
Acquisition Strategy

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Affordability Assessment

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Capability Development Document CJCS Instruction 3170.01
Chief Information Officer
DoD Instruction 5000.02
Confirmation of CCA Compliance
Corrosion Plan

DoD Instruction 5000.67
DoD Instruction 5000.02

Cost Analysis Requirements
Description (CARD)

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Defense Acquisition Executive
Summary

DoD Instruction 5000.02

DoD Component Cost Estimate

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Exit Criteria

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Independent Technology
Readiness Assessment

DoD Instruction 5000.02
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(if required by the office of the
Director, Defense Research and
Engineering)
Information Support Plan (ISP)
(All IT–including NSS)

DoD Directive 4630.05
DoD Instruction 4630.8

Initial Capabilities Document

CJCS Instruction 3170.01

Item Unique Identification
Implementation Plan

DoD Instruction 8320.04

Life-Cycle Signature Support Plan DoD Directive 5250.01
Life-Cycle Sustainment Plan
(part of Acquisition Strategy)

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Net-Centric Data Strategy
(Approach detailed in ISP)

DoD Directive 8320.02

Operational Test Agency Report of DoD Instruction 5000.02
Operational Test and Evaluation
Results
Preliminary Design Review Report DoD Instruction 5000.02
DoD Instruction 5200.39
Program Protection Plan (for
programs with critical program
information) (includes AntiTamper Annex) (also summarized
in the Acquisition Strategy)
Spectrum Supportability
Determination (applicable to all
systems/equipment that use the
electromagnetic spectrum in the
U.S. and in other host nations)

DoD Directive 4650.1
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System Threat Assessment Report
(STAR)
- validated by Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) for ACAT ID
programs)
- validated by DoD Components
for ACAT IC programs
- Programs on the DOT&E
Oversight List require a STAR
regardless of ACAT designation

DoD Instruction 5000.02
DoD Directive 5105.21
DIA Directive 5000.200
DIA Instruction 5000.002

Systems Engineering Plan

DoD Instruction 5000.02

Technology Readiness Assessment DoD Instruction 5000.02
Test and Evaluation Master Plan

DoD Instruction 5000.02
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Appendix G: Questionnaire
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